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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
However, it would be helpful to have legislative resolution of this
apparent ambiguity.
It should also be noted that the language used by the court
in the Lapensky case is that the plaintiff sought to "perpetuate"
her testimony. While any deposition is a kind of "perpetuation"
of testimony, the word should be avoided on such facts as those
of Lapensky on two grounds. First, the CPA allowed a party to
take a deposition of his testimony as an absolute right and there
was no requirement that the purpose be the perpetuation of
testimony. Secondly, section 3102(c) is the real "perpetuation"
of testimony section; it reserves the word to the endeavor of a
person to take a deposition before an action is commenced. Note
that such a deposition requires a court order; mere notice may
not be used for a pre-action deposition.
Attorney's Work Product and Material Prepared
for Litigation
In Babcock v. Jackson,146 the plaintiff moved to have a
certain statement produced for examination. The statement had
been taken from the defendant by an adjustment bureau em-
ployed by the insurance company which represented the defendant.
In an affidavit, plaintiff's attorney stated that the reason for such
inspection was the mislaying by the police officer of certain notes
pertaining to conversations between the officer and the defendant,
now deceased. Hence, the defendant's statement could not be
obtained in any other manner. The court held that since the
statement was taken by a claim adjuster in the course of a
routine investigation, and not by an attorney or his agent in
preparation for trial, this single circumstance rendered the state-
ment subject to inspection. Such statements obtained by claim
adjusters are not immunized by subdivisions (c) and (d) (which
respectively protect an attorney's work product and material he
prepares for litigation).
Section 3101(c) grants to an attorney's work product un-
qualified immunity from inspection. However, when that pro-
vision was originally drafted, the work product was to be pro-
tected from disclosure "unless the court finds that withholding it
will result in injustice or undue hardship .. .. "147 The Revisers in-
tended to adopt the rule laid down in Hickman v. Taylor, that an
attorney's work product is protected from disclosure unless "good
cause" for revealing it is shown.1 48 When section 3101(c) was
under the CPLR. 3 WEINSTEIN, XoRN & MILLER, NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE
13101.01 (1963).
14640 Misc. 2d 757, 243 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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finally enacted this qualified immunity was omitted. The conse-
quent unqualified immunity that an attorney's work product now
appears to enjoy extends beyond the rule of Hickman and the
intent of the Revisers.
The pivotal question-and the one that gives trouble-is; what
qualifies as an attorney's work product? The present case indicates
that the court will investigate the capacity in which the person
taking the statement acted.' 49  If the statement was taken by
an attorney or his agent in preparation for trial, the statement
would qualify as an attorney's work product. However, if the
same statement were taken from the same individual by a claims
agent or adjuster it would not qualify as an attorney's work
product.
The court did not discuss in any detail whether the state-
ment sought to be inspected qualified under section 3101(d) as
"material prepared for litigation." The court merely stated
that it thought the statement would not be immune from inspection
on that ground.
This holding does not appear to be consistent with present
New York law. In one rather extreme case, it was held that
statements made by a defendant to his insurer in a motor vehicle
accident case should be accorded the status of privileged com-
munication and, therefore, could not be introduced into evidence. 15°
The basis for this holding was that such statements were intended
to be used ultimately by the attorney assigned by the insurance
company to defend the insured. Under the CPLR, a similar
judicial determination would bring such a statement under section
3101(b) regarding "privileged matter." In other cases, such
statements have been held to be work products prepared for
possible use at a trial and, hence, could not be introduced into
evidence unless injustice or undue hardship were shown,' 5' i.e.,
they would now fall under section 3101(d).
Since New York is a compulsory insurance jurisdiction, every
motorist is required to be insured against automobile liability
and consequently, an insurance company is almost automatically
involved in any ensuing litigation. When notified that one of
its policy holders has been involved in an accident the insurance
company normally conducts an investigation which includes the
149 This distinction as to the capacity in which the person acted when
he obtained the statement has been applied in the federal district courts of
New York. E.g., Hughes v. Pennsylvania R.R., 7 F.R.D. 737 (E.D.N.Y.
1948); Thomas v. Pennsylvania R.R., 7 F.R.D. 610 (E.D.N.Y. 1947).
150 Hollien v. KIye, 194 Misc. 821, 87 N.Y.S.2d 782 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
'r' See Schulgasser v. Young, 25 Misc. 2d 788, 206 N.Y.S.2d 81 (Sup. Ct.
1960). See also Cataldo v. County of Monroe, 38 Misc. 2d 768, 238
N.Y.S.2d 855 (Sup. Ct. 1963).
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taking of statements.15 2  An insured who fails to make full
disclosure to his insurer runs the risk of forfeiting coverage by
a breach of the policy's cooperation clause. 1' Therefore, the
insured should be encouraged to make a full and complete
statement to his insurer. 5 4
Yet if the position of the court in the principal case is
adopted, i.e., affording no immunity to a statement made by an
insured to his insurer, an insured in an automobile accident
would have reason to withhold data from his insurer. It would
seem, therefore, that some protection from inspection by a
plaintiff should be accorded to a statement made by an insured
to his insurer. That is not an extreme proposition and appears
to be justified.
As to whether such a statement should be treated as a
privileged communication under section 3101 (b): such treatment
would not appear to be warranted because a privileged communi-
cation (except for such as waiver and the like) enjoys an absolute
immunity; injured victims may therefore not avail themselves of
the contents of such statements, even if they show that hard-
ship would result. The best approach would seem to be to
consider such statements as material prepared for litigation
undei section 3101(d) (2). This would encourage an insured
to make full disclosure to his insurer knowing that his state-
ment is conditionally protected. This approach also takes into
account the interests of an injured victim because he would be
able to inspect the statement if he could show that undue hardship
would result if the statement were withheld.
In Durdovic v. Wisoff, 15 3 the plaintiff moved to examine
certain insurance company employees with respect to conversations
of a physician with plaintiff's intestate prior to their respective
deaths. The plaintiff relied on Babcock v. Jackson as the
authority for his motion. The court distinguished Babcock on
the ground that in Babcock the plaintiff knew the statement was
in existence when the motion for disclosure was made. In
Durdovic the court found that there wa io evidence that there
were any notes in existence or that the physician, before he died,
signed a statement for the insurer.
Party Obtaining a Copy of His Own Statement
In Briggs v. Spencerport Road Plaza, Inc., 6 plaintiffs' at-
torney obtained a statement from an employee of defendant
152 Cataldo v. County of Monroe, sup-a note 151, at 771, 238 N.Y.S.2d at
858.
153 Schulgasser v. Young, supra note 151, at 792, 206 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
154 Hollien v. Kaye, supra note 150, at 825, 87 N.Y.S.2d Pt 786.
15541 Misc. 2d 639, 246 N.Y.S.2d 374 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
156 19 App. Div. 2d 943, 244 N.Y.S.2d 17 (4th Dep't 1963).
